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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to the proceeding in the Court whose 
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed were Plaintiff Sure-
Tech, LLC and Defendants E.M.L. Projects, Ltd., Ecology Manage-
ment, Ltd. and Waste Products, Inc. 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j), the appeal having been transferred from 
the Utah Supreme Court to this Court. 
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ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Sure-Tech, LLC joins in the issues for review as stated 
by Appellees E.M.L. Projects, Ltd., Ecology Management, Ltd. and 
Waste Products, Inc. 
Issues of Fact 
1. Does the evidence support the trial court's ruling 
Charles Schultz ("Schultz") did not revoke his offer to transfer 
his membership interest in Sure-Tech, LLC to Steve Evans 
("Evans") or his nominee prior to the time Evans accepted the 
offer? (Tr. at 69-70.) 
2. Does the evidence support the trial court's ruling 
that Shultz and Robert Pett ("Pett") did not have managerial 
responsibility in Sure-Tech at the time Sure-Tech and Defendants 
entered into a Stipulation of Dismissal? (Tr. at 71.) 
3. Does the evidence support the trial court's ruling 
that Evans had authority to enter into the Stipulation of Dis-
missal on behalf of Sure-Tech? (Tr. at 71.) 
4. Does the evidence show that the court erred in 
relying on Evans' testimony, to the extent the court did so rely? 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's findings of fact are only reversible on 
appeal if clearly erroneous. Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 
919, 922 (Utah 1988). 
- 2 -
Issues of Law 
1. Did the trial court rule correctly on the admis-
sion of documentary evidence and witness testimony? (Tr. at 69.) 
2. Did the court rule correctly, as a matter of law, 
that Evans had authority to dismiss the litigation on behalf of 
Sure-Tech? (Tr. at 71.) 
3. Did the court rule correctly, as a matter of law, 
on the admissibility of evidence? (Tr. at 56, 69.) 
4. Did the court rule correctly in denying Appel-
lants' Rule 60(b)(3) Motion? (R. at 1427.) 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). A 
court's denial of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, however, is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 938; Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
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addition ure-Tech following statute: 
:ached \opendi "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, This is an appeal of the dismissal 
of this case by the trial court pursuant to a Stipulation of the 
parties below, now Appellees to this action. Appellants, who 
were never parties below, challenge the trial court's ruling that 
Steve Evans had authority to agree to dismiss the case for Sure-
Tech, LLC ("Sure-Tech"). 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. Sure-Tech brought this 
action on April 11, 1994, seeking to dissolve E.M.L. Projects, 
Ltd., Ecology Management, Ltd. and Waste Products, Inc. (collec-
tively, "E.M.L.P.") (R. at 2.) One of the Appellants, Charles A. 
Schultz, initially represented Sure-Tech until he was disquali-
fied on April 4, 1995. (R. at 1235-40.) Sure-Tech, by Steve 
Evans, then retained Scott Daniels. (R. at 1256-57.) Through 
Daniels, Sure-Tech and E.M.L.P. filed a Stipulation of Dismissal 
With Prejudice with the court on April 24, 1995. (R. at 1252-
53.) 
Two days later, on April 26, 1995, the court received a 
letter from Charles A. Schultz claiming that Daniels had no 
authority to represent Sure-Tech with regard to the Stipulation 
of Dismissal. (R. at 1258.) Schultz stated that he and the 
other Appellant, Robert Pett, were the only managers and members 
of Sure-Tech, and that neither one of them had retained Daniels 
or authorized a dismissal of the lawsuit. (Id.) 
In response, on April 27, 1995, Daniels filed a Request 
for Hearing, asking that the court "set a hearing, take evidence, 
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and determine who * authority behalf of Srire-Tecli " 
fP at m " i l l „| I'll I | in "M 
setting the ca- • : - rearing Motion * Dismiss" for 
thirty minutes on May 30, 1995, beginning at 9:00 a.m. (R. at 
I2 90-91 , ) 
At the hearing, Daniels appeared "• • " f 
1
 j\. Nebeker appeared for E.M.XJ.JT. O Guy on 
purported epresent sure-Tech through Robert- es 
Schultz. ax *': heard legal argument, witness 
test, i 1110 documentary evidence. Guy on did not 
object taking idence, nor ^e assert his notice 
was inadequate
 ; . : *:« rearing continued, Indeed, 
1 resenting his own 
witnesses and evidence. (See, e.g. 
C. Disposition. The court -niio^ +-v»^f- -i+- uonid c-icm the 
Order Dismissal that day, May 
*..: *•-'-,-^  . „ express and implied author 1 , " 
• *~r - to enter into t settlement agree-
t',-..:«, . negotiating and finalizing the settlement 
agreement" and so the court upheld the settlement agreement. 
) 
lThe transcript has not been paginated as part of the re-
cor (I The transcript is attached as Appendix "B". 
- e -
The court so found because in a November 17, 1994 
letter written by Schultz to Evans, Schultz indicated his 
willingness to convey any interest held by himself and Robert 
Pett in Sure-Tech to Evans. (Tr. at 69.) The court also found 
Evans adopted the offer in a January 9, 1995 letter to Schultz. 
Then, "[i]n reliance on the documents of November of 1994 and 
January of 1995", the members of Sure-Tech replaced Schultz and 
Pett as managers and designated new managers and new registered 
agents. (Tr. at 70.) Further, the court found that, consistent 
with the November 17, 1994 letter, on April 21, 1995, Schultz 
wrote another letter to Evans concerning the conveyance of any 
interest in Sure-Tech. (Tr. at 70.) 
On June 30, 1995, after the Order of Dismissal was 
entered, Schultz and Pett filed a Motion to Vacate Order of 
Dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, claiming that Evans committed perjury at the May 30, 
1995 hearing. (R. at 1368-80.) To support his Motion, Schultz 
attached a November 22, 1994 letter from Schultz to Evans, which 
Schultz claims revoked his November 17, 1994 offer to convey 
ownership of Sure-Tech. (R. at 1373-76.) On August 9, 1995, the 
court denied the Motion. (R. at 1427.) Schultz filed a Notice 
of Appeal on July 3, 1995 (R. at 1404-5), amending it on August 
29, 1995. (R. at 1434-35.) 
D. Statement of Facts. Sure-Tech joins in E.M.L.P.'s 
Statement of Facts (E.M.L.P. Br. at 6-13), and supplements it as 
follows: 
- 7 -
1. During the May 30, 1995 hearing, Daniels ques-
Q. You were just here when Mr. Schultz testified that 
shortly after the November letter he sent you a 
letter rescinding his offer to convey the Sure-
Tech interest to yo\ i? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever receive such a letter? 
A. No, we d i i not. 
2. ' ) 
protect the rights f Steve Evans the hearing, Schultz 
testified as follows: 
Neither Mr. Pett nor I claim any interest in 
those patent rights, and it was our intention 
Steve would always get those. If they came 
to Sure-Tech, we would convey those to Steve. 
(Tr. at 59.) 
3. 60(b)(3) Motion, Schultz attached a 
revoked November convey ownership 
interest Evans proves that Evans committed perjury at iu** 
May ~ earing 
•: . :.- exhibits are apparently misfiled as R, 1 3 06-5 7.) 
4. upport erjury clair 9chultz attached 
a J r i""in." mi \ ed 
November . letter and that Daniels also had a copy of 
±L ±ll h j _ s fii e s # Daniels' letter is as follows: 
I received the copy of the Affidavit of 1 d sa 
Spivey that you sent me along with the 
attachments, I didn't have any :i dea that the 
letter of November 22, 1994, was the letter 
that Charles Schultz was referring to. Steve 
- 8 -
that Charles Schultz was referring to. Steve 
did receive that letter, and I have a copy of 
it in my file. When Mr. Schultz testified 
that he had sent a letter to Steve revoking 
his offer to return his interest in Sure-
Tech, I thought he must be referring to an-
other letter, because I don't read the letter 
of November 22nd as saying that. 
(R. at 1306.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's Order approving the Stipulation of 
the parties to dismiss the case should be affirmed. Schultz and 
Pett should not even be permitted to pursue this appeal because 
of their failure to properly marshal the evidence. Even so, the 
evidence supports the court's findings. 
The trial court committed no error in its findings of 
fact or conclusions of law during the May 30, 1995 hearing. The 
court correctly ruled that to whatever extent Schultz and Pett 
had an ownership interest in Sure-Tech, they offered to convey it 
to Evans in a November 14, 1994 letter. Evans accepted the offer 
in January 1995, and acted in reliance by entering into a Stipu-
lation with E.M.L.P., dismissing the case. The court was also 
correct in holding no revocation of the offer to convey occurred. 
The court was correct in relying on Evans' testimony of not 
having received a letter of revocation because the testimony was 
truthful. 
Further, the court properly denied the Rule 60(b) 
Motion filed by Schultz and Pett. No fraud or misrepresentation 
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occurred during the hearing. In making its rulings, the court 
" j i i d t i i " " in 1 I in mi': 1 in in fin I! mi II mi " n | k i 1 (••'r r r ' i r . 
A R G U M E N T 
I. SCHULTZ AND PETT ARE PROPER PARTIES TO THIS 
APPEAL. 
E.M.L.P. incorrectly argues Schultz and Pett do not 
have standing for this appeal. While argument may 
been waiv- by Sure-Tech and E.M. ippeal. 
The right hallenge - participation iii the 
appellatp rev-if- Utah Assoc, o f 
Counties v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 895 P.2d 825 
(Utah 1995 Waiver without objection, when entity 
-is pprm; . , :li n 
• .i- , particularly • r- \\ . • permittee, 
examine witnesses. Id. Such participation amounts to I nterven-
+•\ on on •* c;:V A acto b-v)s. Jd. See also Utah Assoc, of counties 
v. Tax Commission, 895 P.2d -; (Utah 1995). 
resent case, Schultz and Pett 
ar-1 -^ 'e 1 y r- - l >cipate 3 0, II "9 9 5 1 i< =sai I ng. T 1 
presented evidence ross-examined witnesses and put 
Neither Sure-Tech noi L.iu.ij.i-. 
objected d o the participation ot .Scliu J tz ai i'J I"e I: t. 
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II. SURE-TECH JOINS IN THE REMAINDER OF E.M.L.P.'S 
ARGUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS POINTS II, IV AND V, TO 
FURTHER SHOW EVANS DID NOT COMMIT PERJURY. FRAUD 
OR MISREPRESENTATION IN HIS TESTIMONY, 
Sure-Tech joins in the remainder of arguments of 
E.M.L.P. and supplements its arguments numbered II, IV and V,2 to 
further address the unfounded accusations of perjury, fraud, 
misrepresentation or other misconduct against Steve Evans. 
Schultz incorrectly contends that, on both a legal and factual 
basis, the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of Steve 
Evans. Whether the issues are characterized as legal or factual, 
however, there is simply no basis for a per-jury, fraud or 
misrepresentation claim. 
A person is guilty of making false or inconsistent 
material statements if, under oath, he makes a "false material 
statement . . . and he does not believe the statement to be 
true." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-502(1) (1996). 
Additionally, the elements of fraud in Utah are: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact; (3) which 
was false; (4) which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that he [or she] had insufficient 
knowledge on which to base such representa-
tion; (5) for the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it; (6) that the 
other party, acting reasonably and in igno-
rance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely 
2E.M.L.P.'s arguments are entitled: 
II. The Evidence Introduced Below Fully Supports the Trial 
Court's Decision to Approve the Stipulation of Dismissal. 
IV. The Court's Legal Conclusions Are Each Correct as a Matter 
of Law. 
V. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Appellant's Rule 60(b) 
Motion. 
- 11 -
upon hereby inducec _ ^  
(9) * ~~^ ^amage. 
Maynard v. Whartor ' « - >* (citing 
Duaan v. Jones. 
ted)). 
Negligent misrepresentation "provides that a party 
negligent misrepresentation i material fact may recover 
damages resulting from that injury when the second party had a 
pecuniar rterest i I lu ' « r ns«H*l iu , miiu n i 11«« » mil pii'nf j .n 
to know material facti should have reasonably foreseen 
that the iinfuiy pari y wan . - • • • • • •--. •- Maack 
v.
 R e s o u r c e DeSxan & Construction, inc 
App. ] 994), Schultz has no evidence supporting the perjury, 
fraud or misrepresentation claim. 
Schul* d 
fraud misrepresentation during the May 3 0, 1995 hearing when 
he stated he * never received a letter from Schultz revoking 
hi? ai- A r +"o convey their ownership i n Sure-Tech. 
(Appellant ; ,) Thei: e i s no evidence that Evans ci Id not 
i d U t h e hearing, Ttie testimony oi i which Schultz 
relies is: 
Q. You were just here when Mr. Schultz testified that 
shortly after the November letter he sent you a 
letter rescinding his offer to convey the Sure-
Tech interest to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you e vex receive such a letter? 
A. No, we did not. 
! "l"i I "i ) 
- ] 2 -
The following day, May 31, 1995, Guyon produced a 
letter dated November 22, 1994, which Schultz claims effected a 
revocation of his offer to convey the ownership in Sure-Tech to 
Evans. Daniels responded on June 7, 1995 with a letter to Guyon 
stating in part: 
I didn't have any idea that the letter of 
November 22, 1994, was the letter that 
Charles Schultz was referring to. Steve did 
receive that letter, and I have a copy of it 
in my file. When Mr. Schultz testified that 
he had sent a letter to Steve revoking his 
offer to return his interest in Sure-Tech, I 
thought he must be referring to another let-
ter because I don't read the letter of Novem-
ber 22 as saying that. 
(Tr. at 1306.) 
Rather than support Schultz's argument of perjured, 
fraudulent or misrepresented testimony, the letter proves that 
neither Evans nor his attorney knew the November 22, 1994 letter 
was the one to which Schultz was referring. According to 
Daniels' letter, neither of them read the letter as communicating 
a revocation of the offer to convey. (Tr. at 1306.) 
Schultz repeatedly mischaracterizes Evans' testimony as 
claiming he never received the November 22, 1994 letter. How-
ever, that is not what Evans said. Evans said he did not receive 
a letter in which Schultz revoked his offer to convey. (Tr. at 
29.) That was a true statement at the time and continues to be a 
true statement now. 
There is good reason why neither Evans nor Daniels 
interpreted the letter as effecting a revocation. The letter 
contains no language of revocation. By no stretch of the 
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imagination does the letter state the offer was withdrawn. The 
letter does not even address the previous offer. (R. at 1302.) 
Indeed, the letter shows the reason the lawsuit was brought in 
the first place was to protect the rights of Evans individually, 
not Sure-Tech as a company and certainly not Schultz or Pett. 
Additionally, neither Schultz nor Guyon identified a 
date the letter was sent with enough specificity for Evans or 
Daniels to know the November 22, 1994 letter was the one to which 
Schultz was referring. There is nothing in Schultz7s testimony 
or evidence to support his claim that Evans or Daniels should 
have been able to interpret the information given as referring to 
the November 22, 1994 letter. Accordingly, there is no evidence 
that Evans committed perjury, fraud or misrepresentation at the 
May 30, 1995 hearing and to whatever extent the trial court 
relied on Evans' testimony in making its judgment, the court made 
no error. 
Schultz also complains that the trial court erred in 
not considering his November 22, 1994 letter in making its 
judgment at the hearing. If the failure to consider the letter 
was error, any error was harmless. First, the letter was before 
the trial court. Schultz submitted the letter to the court as 
support for his Rule 60(b)(3) Motion. The letter provided the 
very basis of the Motion. Nevertheless, the court denied the 
Motion. 
Second, a reading of the letter by this Court now 
reveals that the letter does not constitute a revocation by 
- 14 -
Schultz of his previous offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to 
Evans. The letter contains no language of revocation, no refer-
ence to the previous offer and affirms that the lawsuit was 
initially filed to protect Evans' interest. Accordingly, even 
if the trial court erred in failing to consider the letter, the 
error was harmless and the trial court's judgment should be 
affirmed. 
III. SURE-TECH IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FROM SCHULTZ AND 
PETT FOR BEING COMPELLED TO RESPOND TO THEIR 
FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Sure-Tech joins in the portion of the brief of E.M.L.P. 
addressing sanctions under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, 
and extends the argument to apply to itself as well as E.M.L.P. 
The parties negotiated in good faith and reached a settlement. 
Schultz and Pett now seek, for the second time, to disturb the 
settlement and related Order of Dismissal without once stating 
the basis for their objection to the dismissal, other than their 
lack of involvement. 
Schultz and Pett have never divulged the nature of 
their claimed injury. It is difficult to imagine what their 
injury could be given that, by Schultz7s own admission, the 
lawsuit was "only filed in order to secure [Evans'] rights to 
work in the environmental field and particularly the right to use 
the waste water treatment system [he] assigned to EML.11 (Tr. at 
59.) Further, at the May 30, 1995 hearing, Schultz specifically 
disclaimed any interest on either his part or Pett's in Evans7 
- 15 -
patent rights and stated if "they came to Sure-Tech [Schultz and 
Pett] would convey those to Steve." (Tr. at 59.) 
Accordingly, under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, 
Sure-Tech requests sanctions be entered against Schultz and Pett 
for double costs, including attorneys' fees, incurred in respond-
ing to this frivolous appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Schultz and Pett have failed to present any errors 
regarding the trial court's findings of fact or conclusions of 
law. Sure-Tech respectfully requests that the Court affirm the 
May 30, 1995 Order of Dismissal. 
DATED this y^" day of April, 1997. 
JENNIFER /L. F«LK 
DAWN JV^SOPER 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellee Sure-Tech 
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APPENDIX "A" 
76-8-502 CRIMINAL CODE 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-501, enacted by L. Oath, statutory construction, § 68-3-12. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-501. Response to civil antitrust investigative de* 
Cross-References. — Absentee voting affi- mand as part of an official proceeding, § 76-10* 
davits, falsification, § 20A-3-310. 917. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Cited in State v. Strand, 720 P.2d 425 (Utah 
1986); State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 
1986). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 60AAm. Jur. 2d Perjury § 1. 
C.J.S. — 70 C.J.S. Perjury §§ 2, 3. 
A.L.R. — Admonitions against perjury or 
threats to prosecute potential defense witness, 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-502, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-502. 
ANALYSIS 
Evidence. 
John Doe proceedings. 
Oath or affirmation. 
Cited. 
Evidence. 
In trial for perjury, record of case in which 
alleged perjury was committed was admissible 
in evidence for purpose of showing jurisdiction 
of court, regularity of proceedings, and materi-
ality of alleged perjured testimony, and it was 
duty of court so to limit and restrict its use; 
record could not be considered by jury as proof 
of perjury. State v. Justesen, 35 Utah 105, 99 P. 
456 (1909). 
John Doe proceedings. 
Defendant could not have been guilty of per-
jury in first degree where alleged perjury oc-
curred in proceeding to inquire into commission 
of crime under statutes providing for complaint 
before magistrate; "John Doe complaint" before 
inducing refusal to testify, as prejudicial error, 
88 A.L.R.4th 388. 
Key Numbers. — Perjury <§== 8. 
magistrate out of which indictment for perjury 
arose failed to charge any person with commis-
sion of offense, was not investigation autho-
rized by statute and as such was nugatory 
because complaint was never filed or made 
matter of record in city court, and hearing 
conducted by judge of that court was not judi-
cial proceeding within contemplation of former 
perjury statute. State v. Brady, 18 Utah 2d 434, 
425 P.2d 155 (1967). 
Oath or affirmation. 
For complaint to be considered sworn to afl 
was prescribed by law, there must have been 
some outward formality, some manifestation of 
intention to place affiant under penalty and 
obligation of oath, i.e., definite evidence that 
affiant was conscious that he was taking oath, 
and some outward act from which that con-
sciousness could be inferred; mere signature to 
printed form of oath was not sufficient 
Spangler v. District Court, 104 Utah 584, 140 
P.2d 755 (1943). 
76-8-502. False or inconsistent material statements. 
A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if in any official proceeding: 
(1) He makes a false material statement under oath or affirmation or 
swears or affirms the truth of a material statement previously made and 
he does not believe the statement to be true; or 
(2) He makes inconsistent material statements under oath or affirma-
tion, both within the period of limitations, one of which is false and not 
believed by him to be true. In a prosecution under this section, it need not 
be alleged or proved which of the statements is false but only that one or 
the other was false and not believed by the defendant to be true. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Sure-Tech vs. EML Projects, 940902389. 
3 Counsel will state an appearance. 
4 MR. DANIELS: My name is Scott Daniels. I purport to 
5 be representing Sure-Tech in this matter. I guess that's 
6 really the issue of who does represent Sure-Tech. I am counsel 
7 of record, though, at this moment. 
8 MR. NEBEXER: Richard K. Nebeker for the defendants. 
9 1 MR. GUYON: Just a moment, your Honor. I represent 
10 Robert Pett and Charles Schultz, and, through them, Sure-Tech. 
11 And, again, that's one of the issues. 
12 THE COURT: On the motion to disqualify? 
13 MR. GOYON: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: Why don't you come up and take a seat in 
15 front of the bar, and ve will proceed. 
16 MR. DANIELS: Mr. Schultz represented Sure-Tech in 
17 this matter, a motion to disqualify was filed, and that was 
18 granted, and so he has been disqualified from representing 
19 Sure-Tech. I subsequently entered an appearance, and ve have 
2 0 entered into a settlement with the defendants. Mr. Schultz has 
21 now sent the judge a letter. I think you have probably seen 
22 that. 
23 THE COURT: The Court has not reviewed it, but it 
2 4 arrived over the weekend, and — actually, it is an unsigned 


























MR. DANIELS: That's the order that I submitted when 
we settled the case. Mr. Schultz has taken the position that I 
can't do that, because I don't represent Sure-Tech, and that's 
the issue here today, and why I asked for a hearing, because I 
guess we need to take some evidence and determine just who is 
Sure-Tech, and that's the issue. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. DANIELS: I would like to call Mr. Steve Evans as 
a witness. 
STEVEN THOMAS EVANS, 
called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DANIELS: 
Q. State your full name for the record. 










Are you familiar with a business entity known as 
•> 
• 
Yes, I am. 
What kind of a business entity is that? 
It is an LLC. 
Limited liability company? 
Yes. 
Are you a member of that? , 
Yes. 
3 
1 Q. Are you at this moment a manager of Sure-Tech? 
2 A. No, I am not. 
3 Q. Who are the managers of Sure-Tech, to your knowledge? 
4 A. Well, at this time, we had a meeting of members, and 
5 Fred Evans and Lionel Koon were elected as the new managers. 
6 Q. Fred Evans is your father? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Let me show you what has been marked Plaintiff's 
9 Exhibit 1. Do you recognize that document? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. What is that? 
12 A. This was the original document, when Sure-Tech was 
13 first put together, as to who the members or the make-up of 
14 members was to be. 
15 Q. Were there changes in that, subsequently? 
16 A. Yes, there were. Mr. Bradshaw was not included in as 
17 any involvement in Sure-Tech, and we rearranged, you know, what 
18 the positions were. It was going to be Charles Schultz and 
19 Robert Pett were to be the managers, and myself, my father, my 
2 0 mother and Charlie were to have ownership. 
21 I Q. So this 26 percent that belonged to Dean Bradshaw was 
22 supposed to be distributed through the other members? 
23 A. No, we just canceled it out. 
2 4 Q. $o your percentage increased to over something over 
25 50 percent, I guess? 
A. Yes, it was about 55 percent. 
Q. Your mother and father's interest also increased? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would your understanding be Mr. Schultz' interest 
would also increase to 18 percent? 
A. Right. 
Q. Now, let me show you what — 
THE COURT: Counsel, the Court is having trouble 
hearing what's going on. Would you like to take a break, and 
take time to visit with your client, and we will come back on 
the record? 
MR. GUYON: This is fine, your Honor. I will be 
quiet. 
THE COURT: The Court doesn't want you to do that. 
It is a distraction to the Court and probably all counsel where 
you are conferring loud enough with your client where we can 
hear you at the bench. 
Q. Let me show you what has been marked Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2, and ask you if you can identify that for the record? 
A. Yes. This is the printout from the State of Utah 
after the papers had been filed with the State, showing the 
breakdown of who all the members are, and the new managers. 
Q. Who are the members, according to that? 
A. According to this, it shows Robert J. Pett, Charles 
A. Schultz, Steve Evans, Fred B. Evans. 
5 
1 Q. Who are they, again? I am sorry. 
2 A. It shows here Robert J. Pett, Charles A. Schultz, 
3 Steve Evans, and Fred B. Evans. 
4 Q. Is it your understanding those are the members at 
5 this time? 
6 A. Yes. There should also be Lionel Koon. 
7 Q. About how much percentage would you own, Mr. Evans? 
8 A. 50 percent. 
9 Q. How much would your father own? 
10 I A. I believe right around 20 percent, 19 to 20 percent, 
11 something like that. 
12 Q. Let me show you what has been marked Plaintiff's 
13 Exhibit 4, and ask you if you can identify that document? 
14 A. Yes. This is the — yes. This is when Sure-Tech was 
15 originally formed, these were the papers that were filed by 
16 Charles Schultz. 
17 I Q. Those are the original articles? 
18 A. The original articles of — not incorporation — 
19 whatever they call it. 
2 0 Q. You will note there — did I leave my other copy with 
21 you? I lost one. Thank you. You will note there, in article 
22 6, the managers of Sure-Tech are Robert Pett and Charles 
23 Schultz? 
24 A. Yes. 
2 5 Q. And they were to serve as managers until the first 
1 meeting of members; is that right? 
2 A. Right. 
3 Q. Did you ever have a meeting of members? 
4 A. Yes, we did. 
5 Q. When was the first meeting of members that you ever 
6 had? 
7 A. Well, the first one that we had, that was official, 
8 that I am aware of, was just a couple of months ago. I can't 
9 remember the exact date. They did minutes of that meeting. 
10 I Q. Let me show you what has been marked Exhibit 5, and 
11 ask you if you can identify that document? 
12 A. Yes, I can. This is the minutes of the meeting that 
13 we held, of the members. 
14 I Q. Did you cause notice to be sent out to all of the 
15 members? 
16 A. Yes. Notice was sent out to all the members. 
17 I Q. Did you know who sent that notice out? 
IS A. Yes. Pamela did, Pamela Evans. 
19 I Q. Pamela Evans is your wife? 
2 0 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
21 Q« Let me show you what has been marked Exhibit 3. I 
22 ask you if you can identify that document? 
23 A. Yes. This is the settlement negotiations, which we 
2 4 entered into with Callister, Duncan & Nebeker. 
2 5 Q. Did you sign that? 
1 A* Yes, I did. 
2 Q. That's a document that, in your view, settles this 
3 case? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Let me back up a little bit. The Sure-Tech 
6 corporation, or LLC, was formed and the articles filed, 
7 according to the exhibit, January 14, 1993? 
8 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
9 Q. At that time you were about a 50-percent owner, 
10 right? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 ] Q. Your father and mother owned some percentage? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Mr. Schultz owned some percentage? 
15 A. That's right. 
16 I Q. What was the purpose of Sure-Tech? What was its 
17 function? 
18 A. Well, it was set up — I developed some applications 
19 for water treatment, and we entered into a contract with a 
20 company called Ecology Management, which EML Projects, Ltd., 
21 where I assigned the future patent rights. In return for them 
22 having the right to sell that or market that waste treatment 
2 3 system, which I had ownership to, we were to be given 2 0-
2 4 percent ownership of EML Projects, Ltd. So we then set up 
25 Sure-Tech, LLC, because Charlie had been involved with us in 
1 past businesses. My father had been involved, and myself, so 
2 we set up Sure-Tech, LLC, as the vehicle to be able to disburse 
3 all profit and loss. Mr. Schultz and then his law clerk, 
4 Robert Pett, were set up as the managers of Sure-Tech, LLC, 
5 because I had tax liability, and I couldn't show as any part to 
6 it. 
7 Q. You didn't want your name on the public records? 
8 A. That's right. 
9 Q. In your view, you were a member? 
10 I A. Yes. Well, from my view, I owned the company. I was 
11 the largest owner of the company. 
12 Q. Then your father owned some? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And Mr. Schultz owned some. What did he do to 
15 contribute? , 
16 A. Mr. Schultz contributed some cash, but it was mostly 
17 his time and energy as an attorney and legal counsel. 
18 I Q. You kind of paid your attorney's fees by giving him 
19 part of it? 
20 A. Yea. 
21 Q. The purpose of the LLC was to distribute the money 
22 you received — 
23 A. It was to distribute any of the profit or loss that 
2 4 would be received from EML Projects, Ltd., back to us. That's 
25 what an LLC is set up for. You can have that vehicle so that 
it comes through/ through to you. 
Q. Were those profits to be distributed in accordance 
with the percentages that are in Exhibit l? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were any profits ever distributed? 
A. No, they were not. There weren't any made. 
Q. And then recently, the members held a meeting, after 
notice, and based on those minutes changed the manager, right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Why did you change — why did you do that? 
A. Well, we weren't quite happy with what was going on. 
We tried to work out a settlement arrangement with Charles 
Schultz and EML Projects, Ltd./ on this case and on another 
case. We didn't feel our interest as members was being served. 
So we had a meeting of the members. Lionel Koon earlier, 
around in November December/ I had given him 5 percent of my 
ownership into Sure-Tech. That's how Lionel Koon became part 
owner into Sure-Tech. And so, basically, we just got together 
and had a meeting. We sent out notice. And we hoped we could 
have gotten everything settled before doing that. 
Q. At that meeting who became the managers then? 
A. At that meeting Fred B. Evans became a manager and 
Lionel Koon became a manager. 
Q. And then they contacted me and retained me? 
A. That's right. 
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1 Q. Subsequently, you entered into the settlement 
2 agreement that's there as Exhibit — what is it? 
3 A. Exhibit 3. 
4 Q. You want to settle this case and end it? 
5 A. Yes, we do. 
6 Q. All right. Now, previously, did you — did Mr. 
7 Schultz offer to return any of his stock? 
8 A. Yes. Well, actually, Charlie had sent me letters, 
9 stating that he would assign back Sure-Tech to me. He himself 
10 and Robert Pett would assign Sure-Tech back. Then I could 
11 settle the case however we wanted to settle it. 
12 Q. Let me show you what has been marked as Exhibit 6 and 
13 Exhibit 7, and ask you if you can identify those documents? 
14 MR. GUYON: I think I object to this line of 
15 questioning. It involves settlement negotiations, which are 
16 not admissible at trial or hearing. 
17 MR. DANIELS: It is not settlement negotiation. This 
18 is what this case is about, is a settlement. It would be 
19 absurd to exclude all the evidence based on settlement 
2 0 negotiations. I am offering this document to show that he 
21 agreed to return the stock. 
22 A. Yes, this is — 
2 3 THE COURT: Just a moment. The objection is 
24 overruled. 
2 5 Q. Would you identify Exhibit 6, please? 
11 
1 A. Yes, This is the letter I received from Charlie, 
2 outlining the fact that he would assign Sure-Tech back to me. 
3 Q. You received that letter from him? 
4 A. Yes, I did. 
5 Q. Did you receive that on or about the date indicated 
6 on the letter? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Did you respond to him? 
9 A. Yes, I did. 
10 Q. Would you identify Exhibit 7. 
11 A. Yes. On January 9, I responded to Charlie. 
12 Q. Telling him to return the stock? 
13 A. That's right. That I would accept his offer of doing 
14 that. 
15 I Q. Did he ever do that? 
16 I A. No, he did not. 
17 I Q. Is that one of the reasons you called the meeting? 
18 A. Yes, that is. 
19 MR. DANIELS: Your Honor, I would offer all those 
20 exhibits in evidence, please. 
21 THE COURT: Any objection? 
22 MR. NEBEKER: No objection from the defendant. 
2 3 MR. GOYON: The only one, your Honor, I have any 
24 objection to is the one it is called Schultz Deposition Exhibit 
2 5 No. 2, and I don't think there has been an appropriate 
12 
1 foundation for that document. 
2 MR. DANIELS: Let me go back and see if I can do a 
3 little better on that. 
4 Q. That's Exhibit 1, I believe, Mr. Evans. 
5 A. Yes. 
6 THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
7 Q. Can you tell us more about that document, where it 
8 came from? 
9 A. This document is one of the documents I believe that 
10 Mr. Schultz supplied with a deposition that was taken by EML 
11 Projects, Ltd. That deposition outlined the fact that I was a 
12 member of Sure-Tech, LLC, along with my parents. 
13 I Q. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of 
14 the document? 
15 A. Yes, we did. 
16 I Q. That's what I want to get to. 
17 A. Yes. Originally, this document was prepared, we 
IS tried to put together who all had either put in time, money or 
19 consideration into getting something from Sure-Tech, LLC. 
20 I Q. Did you have anything to do with preparing that 
21 document? 
22 A. Yes. I put together the numbers, and then I believe 
2 3 Teresa Cross is the one who typed up the document. 
2 4 Q. Let me show you what has been marked Exhibit 8, and 
25 ask you if you can identify that document? 
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1 A. Yes, I can. 
2 Q. What is it? 
3 A. This is the breakdown showing what people had put 
4 into the company, et cetera, and what we were giving credit 
5 for. It came from my notes, and then I believe Teresa Cross is 
6 probably the one who typed it up. 
7 Q. Is Exhibit l sort of a summary? 
8 A. Yes, it is. 
9 1 Q. Were they made at the same time? 
10 A. Approximately, probably the same day. 
11 MR. DANIELS: I would offer Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 8. 
12 MR. GUYON: I object. There is no indication they 
13 relate directly to Sure-Tech. This is from a deposition in 
14 another case relating to different matters. It is my 
15 understanding from my client, Mr. Schultz, that neither of 
16 these documents relate directly to Sure-Tech. 
17 THE COURT: The Court will give you an opportunity to 
18 conduct examination on the foundation question. You may 
19 proceed. Would you like to do that now? 
20 VOIR-DIRE EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR* GUYON: 
22 Q. Mr. Evans, you have indicated that the documents 
2 3 here listed as Schultz Deposition Exhibit 2, which is 
2 4 Exhibit 1, is a summary of Schultz Deposition Exhibit 1; is 
2 5 that correct? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. You indicated further that you were involved in the 
3 preparation of both of these documents; is that correct? 
4 A. That is correct. 
5 Q. Is it not correct, Mr. Evans, that these documents 
6 were prepared to show liability relating to Bradshaw and Evans, 
7 and not Sure-Tech, Incorporated? 
8 A. No, that is not correct. 
9 Q. Is it correct to say that the deposition record of 
10 Mr. Schultz will say that these documents related to the 
11 ownership of Sure-Tech? 
12 MR. DANIELS: I will object to that. He is asking 
13 him what the deposition says. I am not sure he is familiar 
14 with the deposition. 
15 Q. Were you present during the deposition of 
16 Mr. Schultz? 
17 A. I don't believe I was. 
13 Q. Were you — do you have any recollection as to who 
19 was, in fact, present at the deposition of Mr. Schultz? 
20 A. Yes. My mother, Beatrice Evans; I believe my father, 
21 Fred Evans; and Bryan Pishburn; and Charles Schultz. 
2 2 Q. Your mother and your father are not here apparently? 
23 I A. My father is in the hospital. 
2 4 Q. Did you attend the deposition? 
25 A. I was at the deposition. I wasn't — I don't believe 
15 
1 I was in the deposition. I don't think I was allowed to be, 
2 Q. What you are saying, as I understand it, is that you 
3 were present in the room — or not present in the room, but 
4 present at the location? 
5 A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
6 Q. Subsequent to that time have you had an opportunity 
7 to review Mr. Schultz' deposition? 
8 I A. Yes, I have. 
9 Q. Did you read Mr. Schultz' testimony? 
10 I A. I believe I did. 
11 Q. Is it your testimony that Mr. Schultz offered these 
12 exhibits at that deposition for the purpose of demonstrating 
13 ownership of Sure-Tech? 
14 MR. DANIELS: I will object to him asking the 
15 questions about the deposition. We can have the deposition 
16 here. We can read it. What Mr. Evans thinks it says is not 
17 relevant. 
18 THE COURT: Sustained. 
19 I MR. GUYON: That is my point. I move these documents 
20 not be admitted. 
21 THE COURT: The Court will defer the admission of 
2 2 that particular document until there has been a completion of 
2 3 the testimony, and the Court will determine at that time if it 
2 4 has been connected and there has been an adequate foundation. 



























THE COURT: Cross-examination? 
MR. NEBEKER: The defendant has no questions. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GUYON: 
Q. Mr. Schultz, when did you first became aware of the 
organi2ation of Sure-Tech, a limited liability company, here? 
A. Mr. Evans, you mean? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. We organized Sure-Tech, LLC back when we started 
negotiations with EML Projects, Ltd., and that was in December, 
I believe, of '93. 
Q. I have here the articles of incorporation, which 
indicate they were signed and prepared on the 13th and 14th of 






You mean Exhibit 4? 
I believe that is the 
Yes. 
The signatures there, 






You indicated in your 
exhibit. 
Mr. Robert Pett 
prior testimony 
that you attended was one that was 










1 A. That's right. 
2 Q. You never attended any meeting prior to that time? 
3 A. No. 
4 1 Q. Are you aware of the existence of an operating 
5 agreement of Sure-Tech, Ltd.? 
6 A. There was none. 
7 Q. There was none? 
8 I am sorry, your Honor, I only have an original and 
9 copy. May I approach? 
10 THE COURT: You may. 
11 Q. Mr. Schultz — I mean Mr. Evans, what is the title of 
12 that document? 
13 A. It shows here operating agreement of Sure-Tech, LLC. 
14 Q. I am going to direct your attention to pages 15 and 
15 16 of that agreement. Are there signatures there? 
16 A. Yes, there are. 
17 Q. Are they original signatures? 
18 A. I can't attest to that, but they look original. They 
19 are in blue in*. 
20 I Q. Whose signatures are there? 
21 I A. Robert Pett and Charles A. Schultz. 
22 I Q. Directing your attention to section 1.4 on the first 
2 3 page of that document, whose names occur there? 
24 I A* Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz. 
25 Q. Directing your attention to section 1.4-1, the top of 
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1 the next page 2, indicates the managers? 
2 A. Robert J. Pett, Charles A. Schultz. 
3 Q. Directing your attention to page 3, article 5, 
4 section 5.1, indicates the members and the percentage of their 
5 contribution and its value. What is the contribution and value 
6 of Robert J. Pett's capital contribution, from that document? 
7 A. It shows $10. 
8 Q. That's what percentage? 
9 I A. 1 percent. 
10 Q. And it shows below that Mr. Schultz? 
11 A. $990. 
12 Q. What percentage is that? 
13 A. 99 percent. 
14 MR. GDYON: I move for the admission of the operating 
15 agreement of Sure-Tech. 
16 MR. DANIELS: Objection, lack of foundation. He has 
17 never seen it before. 
18 THE COURT: The Court will give you an opportunity to 
19 conduct voir dire on the foundation question, if you would 
20 like. 
21 MR. DANIELS: Have you ever seen that document 
2 2 before today? 
2 3 THE WITNESS: No, I have not. 
2 4 MR. DANIELS: That's all. 
25 THE COURT: Objection is overruled. It is received. 
19 
1 It needs to be marked, Counsel. You bypassed the cleric in that 
2 process* 
3 MR. GDYON: I know. I am a little short on time here 
4 getting started. May I substitute a copy of the operating 
5 agreement, your Honor, for the original? 
6 THE COURT: Do you have a copy with you? 
7 MR. GUYON: I have one copy. I will have that 
8 marked. This will be Exhibit A, your Honor. 
9 Q. (By Mr. Guyon) Mr. Evans, you had indicated, and I 
10 believe one of the exhibits is the record from the Utah 
11 Department of Commerce, Division of Corporations, Commercial 
12 Code. Do you have a copy of that? 
13 A. Yes. I believe it is No. 2. 
14 Q. On the second page of that, it indicates, line No. 8, 
15 that amended articles were filed to change the managers and add 
16 new members, correct? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And that's the change that's indicated or that you 
19 have testified that resulted from your meetings? 
20 I A. Yes. 
21 Q. During the course of your meeting on about the 10th 
22 of April, did you discuss the past history at all of Sure-Tech 
2 3 as a limited corporation? 
2 4 A* Let me turn to the minutes. No, we did not. 
25 Q. Did you discuss at all the legal reports to alter the 
20 
1 membership of the corporation? 
2 A. Yes, ve did. 
3 Q. Are you familiar with the applicable provisions of 
4 the limited liability partnership act as to that position? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. What do they provide, to your knowledge? 
7 A. Well, an LLC is put together to be able to distribute 
8 profit or loss to the members, and as we were to receive the 
9 profit or loss, that makes us members, and by being that we 
10 were members, we then held the meeting and made the changes. 
11 I Q. Are you aware of the specific provision of the Utah 
12 Code Annotated Section 48-2b-l3l, which deals with transfer of 
13 membership? 
14 I A. I have read through that, but no. 
15 Q. If I indicated to you that specifically it says or 
16 deals with — says that if the nontransferring members entitled 
17 to receive the majority of the nontransferred profits do not 
18 consent, the transferee has no right to participate in the 
19 management of the business. 
2 0 MR. DANIELS: I am sorry, what was your question? 
21 MR. GUYON: Is he familiar with that? 
22 A. NO. 
23 I Q. Are you familiar with the operating agreement 
2 4 requirements as to the transfer of ownership and management? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. What does that provide? 
2 A. If I remember right, as far as being a member or 
3 whatever, and going by what was filed by Mr. Schultz and 
4 Mr. Pett when the company was first formed, having the first 
5 meeting of members, we were able to and were to change the 
6 managers. 
7 Q. Are you familiar with Section 48-2b-122 of the code, 
8 which relates to the filing of, creating of additional members? 
9 It says, and I will quote, may be familiar with this, "After 
10 the filing of a limited liability company's original articles 
11 of organization, additional members may be admitted as provided 
12 in the operating agreement.91 Did you comply with the terms and 
13 conditions of the operating agreement in admitting yourselves 
14 as members to this limited liability corporation? 
15 I A. There was no operating agreement. 
16 I Q. It says, MIf the operating agreement does not provide 
17 for the additional members, with the written consent of all 
18 members, except that, notwithstanding any provision of the 
19 operating agreement, no additional member may be admitted 
20 without the written consent of the members entitled to receive 
21 a majority of the profits of the company." Did you obtain 
22 written consent of Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz in performing your 
23 change of administration of this limited liability corporation? 
24 A. NO. 
25 I MR. GUYON: I have nothing further. 
22 
1 THE COURT: Redirect? 
2 MR, DANIELS: No more questions, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: You may step down. 
4 Call your next witness. 
5 MR. DANIELS: I would like to call Mr. Schultz. 
6 CHARLES A. SCHULTZ, 
7 called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
8 testified as follows: 
9 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
10 BY MR. DANIELS: 
11 Q. Mr. Schultz, state your full name for the record. 
12 A. Charles A. Schultz. 
13 Q. Mr. Schultz, there are several lawsuits involving 
14 you, the Evanses, EML, Sure-Tech, are there not? 
15 A. No, there are not. There is one lawsuit involving 
16 Sure-Tech. 
17 I Q. There is another lawsuit entitled Charles A. Schultz 
18 and Beatrice Evans vs. Robert O'Leary and others? 
19 A. Correct. 
20 I Q. You had your deposition taken in that case, didn't 
21 you? 
22 I A . I did. 
23 I Q. In that case the documents that we have been talking 
2 4 about here, Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 8, were admitted — not 
25 admitted, but they were attached to your deposition as exhibits 
23 
1 to your deposition, were they not? 
2 A. I don't know. I have never seen my deposition. 
3 Q. Didn't they send it to you to sign it? 
4 A. They never did. I have never seen it. 
5 MR. DANIELS: I have a copy, Mr. Guyon. Do you have 
6 any objection to me using the copy of his deposition? 
7 MR. GOYON: If he gets a chance to review it, I have 
8 no objection. 
9 MR. DANIELS: Maybe I will have this marked as an 
10 exhibit. 
11 Q. Let me show you what has been marked Plaintiff's 
12 Exhibit 9, Mr. Schultz. It purports to be a copy of your 
13 deposition that was taken in that case. Does it appear to be 
14 that's what it is? 
15 A. It appears that that's what it purports to be, yes. 
16 MR. DANIELS: Your Honor, I would ask the Court to 
17 take judicial knowledge of the deposition. It is a deposition 
18 that was taken in a related case, filed in this court, before 
19 another judge, but still in the third district. 
2 0 THE COURT: Do you object to appropriate excerpts 
21 being referred to in the deposition? 
2 2 MR. GUYON: I have no objection to the excerpts. I 
23 suspect 99 percent of that has nothing to do with this, and is 
2 4 not relevant. 
2 5 THE COURT: That's the reason the Court asked the 
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1 question about relevant excerpts being used from the 
2 deposition. 
3 MR. GUYON: I have no objection to relevant excerpts. 
4 THE COURT: You may proceed on that basis. The Court 
5 will not admit the entire deposition. 
6 MR. DANIELS: I think what he says is true that 
7 99 percent of it is something else. I only have one copy. Do 
8 you mind if I ask him questions from here, your Honor? 
9 THE COURT: You may. 
10 (Counsel is reading from the deposition.) 
11 I Q. Is it your testimony today, as it was in the 
12 deposition, that Sure-Tech was set up to distribute the profits 
13 received from EMLP? 
14 A. That was one of the purposes, yes. 
15 I Q. And those profits were to be distributed along these 
16 percentage lines, that you were to receive approximately 15 
17 percent? 
18 J A. Correct. 
19 Q. You have never claimed more than 15-percent interest? 
2 0 A. 15-percent interest in the profit from EMLP, no. 
21 I Q. Nov, on November 17, did you send Mr. Evans this 
22 letter, Exhibit 6? 
23 A. Yes, I did. 
2 4 Q. Agreeing to return or give Mr. Evans his interest in 
2 5 Sure-Tech, or give back all interest in Sure-Tech? 
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1 A. Yes, I did. 
2 I Q. Excuse me, that's what? 
3 A. Six. 
4 Q. Then he responded with Exhibit 7, did he not? 
5 A. He did sometime later, a couple of months later. 
6 1 MR. DANIELS: I have no more questions. Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: cross-examination? 
8 MR. NEBEXER: No questions from the defendants. 
9 CROSS-EXAMJNATION 
10 BY MR. GUYON: 
11 Q. Mr. Schultz, directing your attention to the Exhibit 
12 ] 'Ho. 6, your letter, wfcat were tfce circumstances at tbe time 
13 that that letter was proposed, a* they relate to Sure-Tech? 
14 A. That was prior to a hearing on a motion to disqualify 
15 me as counsel for Sure-Tech, and a number of things. I had 
16 just terminated my business relationship with Steve and Lionel 
17 Koon in a company called SLC Environmental. I couldn't adhere 
18 to the business practices, so I terminated in relationship to 
19 them. 
2 0 Q. As part of that termination did you offer to settle 
21 all of your claims with them? 
22 I A. I am sorry, I don't understand your question. 
23 Q. Were there more claims than the claims represented in 
24 Exhibit 6? 
25 A. No. Exhibit 6 deals surely — excuse me -- solely 
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1 with Sure-Tech in that lawsuit. 
2 Q. And a response was received, you indicated, some 
3 months subsequent? 
4 A. Correct, 
5 Q. Approximately how long was that? 
6 A. It was just about two months. 
7 I Q. Had there been a change in circumstances between the 
8 writing of your letter, Exhibit 6, and at receipt of the 
9 response, Exhibit 7? 
10 A. Yes. Prior to that time, approximately -- I guess a 
11 week — no, probably ten days to two weeks after this November 
12 17 letter, I sent Steve Evans a letter retracting my offer of 
13 November 17. 
14 Q. Do you have a copy of that letter with you? 
15 A. I do not have a copy of it with me. 
16 I Q. To whom was that letter addressed? 
17 A. It was sent to Steve Evans. 
18 I Q. What was its purpose? 
19 A. Its purpose was to let him know that the offer to 
2 0 convey Sure-Tech to him and his parents was no longer on the 
21 table. 
22 MR. GUYON: Thank you. Nothing further. 
23 MR. DANIELS: You don't have a copy of that letter? 
2 4 THE WITNESS: I don't have it with me, no. 



























THE WITNESS: Yea. 
MS. DANIELS: I have no more questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. DANIELS: I want to call Pam Evans for just one 
question. 
PAMELA EVANS, 
called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 















Would you state your name for the record? 
Pamela Evans. 
Are you related to Steve Evans here? 
I am. 
What way? 
He is my husband. 
You heard him testify that he asked you to send 
the meeting of the LLC to the members? 
Yes. 
Did you do that? 
Yes. 
Did you send one to Mr. Schultz? 
Yes. 
MR. DANIELS: I have no more questions. 
THE COURT: Questions? 
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1 MR. GUYON: None, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: You may step down. 
3 MR. DANIELS: I would like to call Mr. Evans again, 
4 briefly, for one rebuttal question. 
5 STEVEN THOMAS EVANS, 
6 called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
7 testified as follows: 
8 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. DANIELS: 
10 Q. You were just here when Mr. Schultz testified that 
11 shortly after the November letter he sent you a letter 
12 rescinding his offer to convey the Sure-Tech interest to you? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Did you ever receive such a letter? 
15 A. No, we did not. 
16 MR. DANIELS: No more questions. 
17 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. GUYON: 
19 I Q. Mr. Evans, have you ever been convicted of a felony? 
2 0 MR. DANIELS: Your Honor, I need to say something 
21 about this before we go on, if I may. Mr. Schultz has filed 
22 several papers in the other lawsuit, and now in this one, 
2 3 wherein he says that Mr. Evans is a felon. The truth is 
2 4 Mr. Evans was convicted of a felony, that conviction was 
25 expunged, and the record sealed. So it is not a proper matter 
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1 to be brought before the Court in this proceeding. 
2 More troublesome than that is, and I have the 
3 documents here, the petition was filed by attorney Charles 
4 Schultz. So Mr. Schultz finds out about this felony as an 
5 attorney for Mr. Evans, files a petition to have it expunged 
6 for Mr. Evans, and then brings it before this Court, not only 
7 today, but in several of the pleadings, and put on a public 
8 record that Mr. Evans is a felon, which I have a hard time 
9 thinking of a more clear violation of the code of professional 
10 responsibility, when you learn information on behalf of a 
11 client, and then to improperly use it, when he knows very well 
12 that it is not properly before this Court, having been 
13 expunged. It is a very serious concern to me. I wanted to 
14 bring that before the Court, before Mr. Guyon proceeds on this 
15 line of questioning. 
16 I MR. GUYON: May I respond? 
17 THE COURT: Yes. 
18 MR. GUYON: Rule 1.6(b) of the professional code of 
19 ethics is the rule that deals with this particular issue, and 
20 when a client of an attorney or a past client is involved in 
21 activities that are specified, any attorney-client privilege 
22 that is involved is no longer applicable, particularly when it 
2 3 is an on-going attempt to misrepresent to the Court the 
24 evidence that's been presented, I think, your Honor, indicates 
2 5 what is, in fact, going on. By the time this hearing is over, 
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1 I thinX that the Court's mind will be clear as to what the 
2 issues are. In any case, I accept, your Honor, the 
3 representation by Counsel for Mr. Evans that he has, in fact, 
A been convicted of a felony. I have no further questions. 
5 THE COURT: The question is whether or not it is a 
6 matter to be part of the record in this hearing. That was the 
7 objection, was it not? 
8 MR. DANIELS: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: You may argue on those matters. The 
10 Court is interested in whether or not the attorney-client 
11 privilege has been violated, and whether or not an expunged 
12 felony is appropriate for impeachment, whether or not moral 
13 turpitude was involved. 
14 MR. GUYON: First of all, it is my understanding that 
15 the activities resulting in this conviction related to 
16 political activities on behalf of Mr. Evans. My recollection 
17 is it is less than ten years ago. It may be more. But it is 
18 in that approximate period of time. 
19 THE COURT: What date was it expunged? 
20 MR. GUYON: Mr. Daniels may have that record. My 
21 understanding, your Honor, is that the initial documents 
22 relating to expungement were filed, but that subsequent to that 
2 3 the subsequent documents were not. It is my understanding, 
2 4 your Honor, that the record currently is not sealed, has not 
25 ever been sealed, or at least that's the representation to me. 
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I think the only way to ensure that the procedural requirements 
for expungement have been complied with would be to check the 
record itself, and I am not familiar with that, 
THE COURT: The Court invites both counsel to confer 
for a moment, and determine whether or not the felony was 
expunged, and what date that occurred. 
MR. DANIELS: Your Honor, the document I have 
indicates that the order of expungement was signed by Judge 
Tyrone Medley on September 19, 1994. The conviction itself — -
THE COURT: The Court is not concerned about the date 
of the conviction, only the date of expungement. Who filed the 
motion for expungement, and who represented the party — 
MR. GUYON: That was filed by Charles Schultz. He 
did represent him. 
THE COURT: Anything further? The expungement 
document will be marked and received for purposes of this 
hearing. 
MR. GUYON: I think, your Honor, that we have 
everything. 
THE COURT: Do both sides submit on the question of 
whether or not this witness can be asked whether or not he is a 
convicted felon? 
MR. DANIELS: Yes. 
THE COURT: The Court finds and rules as follows. 
Aside from any questions involving the code of professional 
32 
1 conduct and any questions involving the attorney-client 
2 privilege, which are for another day, the Court finds that in 
3 the absence of the expungement record being challenged as 
4 defective, that the felony was, in fact, expunged from the 
5 witness7 records September 19, 1994, by a judge in the Third 
6 District Court, and it is inappropriate to maXe inquiry on — 
7 for purposes of impeachment — on a felony that has been 
8 expunged from the witness' record. The question to which an 
9 objection was made is sustained. 
10 You may proceed. 
11 MR. GUYON: That's all. 
12 MR. DANIELS: We would rest, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
14 MR. 6UY0N: At this point, and it may be appropriate 
15 to make a motion for a directed ruling of the Court, simply on 
16 the basis that the evidence presented to the Court at this 
17 point demonstrates the formation of a limited liability 
18 corporation by Mr. Schultz and Mr. Fett. They demonstrate the 
19 existence of an organizational operating agreement, which was 
2 0 admitted into evidence. That operating agreement, there is no 
21 evidence presented that that operating agreement has been 
22 complied with. Since there is no evidence that it has been 
23 complied with, the original agreement has not been modified. 
2 4 The acts by Mr. Evans and others at this point are nothing more 
2 5 than a nullity, simply because they have failed to comply with 
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1 the requirements specified in the partnership code, as they 
2 relate to the changing of the administration. The argument 
3 that the distribution of profits does not conform to the 
4 operating agreement, does not reach the heart of the matter, 
5 which has to do with ownership and management. 
6 It is much like an automobile, your Honor. I own an 
7 automobile, and I have 100 percent of the liability. My son, 
8 however, drives it, has 100 percent of the use of it. Merely 
9 because one is entitled to the benefits of a corporation does 
10 not permit them to jump in and take control of it. Certainly, 
11 without absence -- or without compliance with the applicable 
12 statutory provisions. 
13 THE COURT: Permit the Court to ask a couple of 
14 questions, and then argument may be presented by additional 
15 counsel. Is the Court missing something in today's hearing? 
16 Are all the cards face up on the table? Why is Mr. Schultz, in 
17 light of the correspondence dated November 17, 1994, and a 
18 confirmation and acknowledgment of that correspondence, dated 
19 January 9, 1995, challenging his noninvolvement as a manager in 
20 this business? 
21 MR. GUYON: Your Honor, it is my understanding — and 
2 2 understand that there has been in other areas substantial 
23 litigation, that relate to the ownership of Sure-Tech. When 
2 4 the offer to make the original settlement was made, as I 
25 understand it, there was a certain series of events that were 
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1 status quo as of that time. 
2 THE COURT: For example? 
3 MR. GUYON: My recollection is that major lawsuit — 
4 and if I may — Mr. Fishburn is the only one here that's even 
5 aware. I will kind of take my cue from him and Mr. Schultz. 
6 But there was substantial litigation involving a corporation by 
7 the name of Unico. Mr. Neil Smith, some other individuals, 
8 relating to an operating agreement, in which the technology of 
9 Sure-Tech was being used. That litigation became extensive. 
10 It ran six months, eight months. Anyway, it was extensive 
11 during the earlier part of the year. A settlement agreement 
12 was made, which was fairly complex, involving seven or eight 
13 different entities, among which was EMLP, to some extent 
14 Sure-Tech was affected by it. 
15 Whatever those circumstances were, Mr. Schultz 
16 determined at that time it would be to his advantage to resolve 
17 this issue. Before the acceptance of that offer was made, some 
18 circumstances changed, and I do not know what, specifically, 
19 they were, which caused him to withdraw his offer of 
20 settlement. Having withdrawn that, any offer is gone, it 
21 can't be relied on. I think we have some evidentiary problems. 
2 2 But, nevertheless, the testimony is that that was done in that 
2 3 manner. I would have to confer, your Honor, with my client for 
24 a short time to determine what the circumstances were that led 
25 to that change of position. If we could take a short recess, I 
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1 would be glad to do that, and maybe inform the Court, or 
2 perhaps that information could be offered to the Court in 
3 chambers. 
4 THE COURT: The Court will give you an opportunity to 
5 confer with your client. Here are the questions that trouble 
6 the Court. November 17, 1994, Mr. Schultz writes a letter, 
7 and, basically, says I aim out of it. Tell me what I need to 
8 do, and I am no longer a player in this company. 
9 January 9, 1995, a confirmation in writing is made in 
10 response to the November 17, 1994 letter. Those are the only 
11 on documents in the record today dealing with Mr. Schultz' 
12 withdrawal or intention to withdraw from the questioned 
13 companies. Neither counsel has raised the issue, but there 
14 certainly appears to be a question of reliance on those 
15 documents, if the owners of the company, in light of the 
16 November 17 initial letter by Mr. Schultz, and the 
17 acknowledging letter of January 9, 1995, by Mr. Evans, sent out 
18 notice that they are going to meet and act in reliance on that 
19 position, they hold a meeting, they vote Mr. Schultz out, 
2 0 consistent with his expressed desire several months previously, 
21 and there is no evidence in the record today that there was any 
2 2 change in plans by anyone prior to the meeting. 
2 3 Then it appears that the only question for the Court 
24 I to decide on the very narrow issue presented to the Court today 
25 is whether or not there was an offer to resign, there was an 
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1 acceptance of the offer, and then, consistent with corporate 
2 practice and procedure, a meeting was conducted by the business 
3 entity, and that managership was changed by a vote of those in 
4 attendance, which constituted a quorum. And subsequent to that 
5 event, they settled their lawsuit, and the matter is over. 
6 Maybe the Court is simplifying the entire procedure 
7 more than it should. But aside from everything else that has 
8 been presented today, it appears that that is the narrow issue 
9 before the Court. 
10 MR. GUYON: I agree with the Court, that that is the 
11 issue. Your Honor, the testimony of Mr. Schultz is that 
12 shortly after the offer, he wrote a letter indicating that he 
13 had withdrawn the offer. 
14 THE COURT: Where is the letter? 
15 MR. GUYON: I will have to ask Mr. Schultz. He has 
16 indicated a copy of it exists. Mr. Evans indicates that he did 
17 not receive a copy. Whether that's true, or not, I don't know. 
18 Let's leave that issue, because of lack of evidence, and go to 
19 the procedural requirements. 
2 0 THE COURT: Yes. There is nothing in the record that 
21 would prompt the Court to give any credence to that statement. 
22 I Go ahead. 
2 3 MR. GUYON: Your Honor, as to the procedural 
2 4 requirements, a limited liability corporation is somewhat 
2 5 different than a regular corporation. I think many of us get 
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1 confused with it. The testimony and the documents indicate an 
2 appropriately formed corporation, they indicate that that — or 
3 limited liability partnership, whatever you want to call it, 
4 was formed, that an operating agreement was established. 
5 Testimony in terms of how that was handled will provide, if the 
6 Court desires additional evidence, indicating that the meetings 
7 were held by Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz, that there was an 
8 agreement to share the distribution of the profits, and that's 
9 fair, your Honor. All of that is in conjunction with it. 
10 But an agreement to share the profits, your Honor, 
11 does not convey an ownership interest in a business. Any 
12 corporation, regardless of its liabilities to its shareholders, 
13 can enter into debt negotiations, require obligations that must 
14 be paid off, regardless of who the ownership is. It becomes a 
15 separate entity. To say that merely because someone is 
16 entitled to a share of the profits, without more, entitles them 
17 also to take over and run a company, without complying with the 
18 statutes, runs full in face of the law, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Tell the Court candidly how you interpret 
2 0 the letter of November 17, 1994. 
21 MR. GUYON: Your Honor, I think the letter was 
22 intended at that time to resolve the issues, and to do exactly 
23 what it said. 
2 4 THE COURT: Meaning what? 
2 5 MR. GUYON: That whatever the control issue was, 
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1 whatever the ownership issue was, that was to be exchanged for 
2 whatever the consideration involved. That was the offer. I 
3 think the document itself says what it is. I thin* the 
4 document is clear. 
5 THE COURT: It is clear to the Court, also. The 
6 second full paragraph says, "It is my intention to convey my 
7 interest in Sure-Tech, and Bob will also convey his interest to 
8 you, or to whomever you direct. Please advise me to whom you 
9 wish it conveyed." It is about as clear and unequivocal as 
10 language can be. 
11 In response to that letter, Evans writes January 9, 
12 1995, as follows: I am sorry that the business relationship 
13 went south. Let's cut our losses and get out of here, is 
14 basically what he says in the letter. We do understand that 
15 you are willing to step out of the picture. We are going to 
16 rely on that. We want this matter settled quickly. It is a 
17 burden to my mother and dad, is basically what he is saying. 
18 And let's be on with it. 
19 Now, tell the Court, after the January 9, 1995 
2 0 letter, what happened that would change the understanding of 
21 Mr. Schultz and those remaining in Sure-Tech. 
22 MR. GUYON: Your Honor, it is my understanding, and I 
23 may have to confer with my client relating to this, but that 
2 4 the offer was made. I believe that there was a rejection of 
2 5 it. Presuming that that is not the case, presuming the Court's 
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1 position is correct, that there were only two documents. Given 
2 those two documents, there is an offer, there is acceptance, 
3 but there is no performance. 
* THE COURT: That taJces us to the third question. Let 
5 me ask that, and excuse the Court for interrupting, then you 
6 respond as you deem appropriate. Was not the acceptance and 
7 the performance — were not those two inseparably connected 
8 when the group met on Sunday, April 9, 1995, and conducted 
9 their meeting, made their vote, and concluded the matter? What 
10 happened between January 9, 1995, and April 9, 199 5, that would 
11 in any way incapacitate the voting out of Mr. Schultz as a 
12 manager, and the voting in of other people as substitute 
13 managers? 
14 MR. GDYON: I think the Court is under 
15 misapprehension of the date of the rejection letter, withdrawal 
16 letter of Mr. Schultz. 
17 THE COURT: No, the Court just hasn't received any 
18 evidence to that. 
19 MR. GUYON: The Court has -- we do not have the 
2 0 document. That may well be Counsel's fault. But my 
21 understanding is a letter was written. Mr. Schultz testified a 
22 letter was written and mailed. Mr. Evans indicated he had not 
23 received it. That's an issue that's unresolved. But at this 
24 point the evidence is, orally, that a letter was sent. Under 
25 the rules, the mailing of the letter indicates or is sufficient 
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1 to determine that it was, in fact, sent, 
2 THE COURT: The best evidence, the Court suggests, 
3 would be the document itself. 
4 MR. GUYON: That's correct. I understand it is an 
5 issue of fact. Nevertheless, my understanding is that 
6 subsequent to the acceptance, between then and the 
7 reorganization, absolutely nothing happened. The funds were 
8 not paid, the equipment was not purchased, the activity 
9 contemplated by the settlement did not occur. 
10 To me, it is like if I sell — again, back to the 
11 car — if I sell you a car, and you agree to pay me for the 
12 car, and at the end of payment I agree to give you a title, 
13 whatever that consideration is, and then you take the title 
14 from me, without paying, I think that's the issue. 
15 THE COURT: Go back to the November letter by your 
16 client. Are there any questions precedent to his withdrawing 
17 from Sure-Tech? 
18 MR. GUYON: Under that letter at that time, I don't 
19 believe so, except that there is an underlying agreement that 
20 certain activities will take care of, because what's being 
21 settled in this one thing is a group of claims and a group of 
2 2 long- standing operations. I understand that, in a contract, 
2 3 that the rules apply in a particular way. And I have objected, 
2 4 your Honor> to the Court's rulings, because these are attempts 
25 at settlement. They are not firm, regardless of their 
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1 statement. They — we get the response, but the performance is 
2 never there. That's why, your Honor, initially, the offer was 
3 rejected. 
4 THE COURT: Tell the Court, after careful reading of 
5 the November 17, 1994 letter, by your client, where any 
6 conditions precedent are expressly or impliedly made? 
7 MR. GDYON: Maybe I better read that little beauty 
8 closely. 
9 THE COURT: Why don't you take a moment and read 
10 through it, and then direct the Court's attention to any 
11 conditions involving the resignation. 
12 (A brief pause in the proceedings.) 
13 THE COURT: Having read the letter of November 19, 
14 1994, authored by your client, Mr. Schultz, and after having 
15 conferred off the record with your client, would you like to 
16 direct the Court's attention to any language in the letter 
17 which you construe to be a condition precedent to the 
18 resignation and withdrawal of your client from any involvement 
19 or interest in the 8ure~Tech company? 
2 0 MR* GUYON: Your Honor, the text of the letter does 
21 not contain such verbiage. However, the issue was one of 
2 2 timely acceptance. There was no timely acceptance. 
2 3 THE COURT: Does it say that in the letter? 
24 MR. GUYON: No, it does not, your Honor. 



























would like to argue in that regard? 
MR. GDYON: I don't believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court will hear from either counsel 
who have yet to respond. 
MR. NEBEKER: Your Honor, I would just like to make 
the position of the defendants known for the record. I think 
it is pretty obvious, the defendants have no knowledge of these 
internal affairs of the plaintiff. However, the defendant did 
believe that Mr. Evans was the majority shareholder and had the 
right to speak for the plaintiff, and in reliance on that 
entered into a three-page, eleven-point settlement agreement 
that has now been executed, and in reliance also entered into 
an order of dismissal — excuse me, a stipulation for 
dismissal, which has been executed. And the position of the 
defendants is that they believed at all times that Mr. Evans 
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MR. NEBEXER: Defendants have no objection. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. They have been 
gracious. 
JAN M. BERGESON, 
called as a witness/ being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DANIELS: 
Q. state your full name for the record/ please. 
A. Jan M. Bergeson. 
Q. What is your profession or calling? 
A. I am an attorney practicing law with the firm of 
Callister, Nebeker & McCullough. I am a shareholder there. 
Q. Have you had occasion to be one of the attorneys who 
has dealt with this matter involving Sure-Tech? 
A. When you say this matter — 
Q. I am talking about the case of Sure-Tech against 
EMLP. 
A. I have not been actively involved in the litigation/ 
as counsel of record/ but I am in charge of the corporate side 
of the work/ so I have been kept informed as to all of the 
events, yes. 
Q. Have you had conversations that involved Mr. Schultz 
and Mr. Evans about Sure-Tech? 
A. Yes. 
44 
1 I Q. Has Mr. Schultz ever indicated to you that Mr. Evans 
2 is a member of Sure-Tech? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Can you tell us when that occurred? 
5 A. It was approximately in January of 19 — I believe it 
6 was 1993, when EML Projects was being formed. Our firm was in 
7 charge of putting together the partnership documents. And 
8 Sure-Tech, LLC, was going to be a limited partner in EML 
9 Projects, and at that time Mr. Schultz was the lawyer who put 
10 together the paperwork for Sure-Tech, and we had asked, as 
11 counsel for EML Projects, who the members of Sure-Tech were 
12 going to be, and Mr. Schultz indicated that it wasn't 
13 finalized, yet, exactly who was going to have what percentage, 
14 but that Mr. Schultz would be a member, Mr. Evans, and some 
15 combination of the Evanses. By "Evanses" I mean Beatrice and 
16 Fred and Pam, Steve's wife. And at that time Mr. Schultz did 
17 not tell me exact numbers. At that point, as counsel for EMLP 
18 Projects, I felt it was okay to go ahead and execute the 
19 partnership documents, without having to have information on 
2 0 who was going to have what percentage. I did understand from 
21 Mr. Schultz that the Evanses would be holding the majority, 
22 because this idea or this patent had been Steve's. 
2 3 MR. DANIELS: That's all I have. Thank you for your 
24 indulgence on that. 
2 5 THE COURT: Any questions? 
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1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. GUYON: 
3 Q. Miss Bergeson, you indicated that the circumstances 
4 that you have discussed occurred bacJc in January of 1993; is 
5 that correct? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And that was related to the preparation of a limited 
8 partnership agreement? 
9 A. Yes, that's correct. 
10 Q. Who were the parties to that limited partnership 
11 agreement? 
12 A. The EMLP Projects, Ltd., partnership agreement? 
13 I Q. I don't know the name of it. Whichever one you have 
14 discussed as being in preparation. 
15 A. Yes, Waste Products, Inc., a Delaware corporation, 
16 was the general partner; and Ecology Management, Ltd., which is 
17 another Utah limited partnership, was the majority limited 
18 partner; and a new LLC was being formed by Mr. Schultz and 
19 Mr. Evans to be , I believe, a 20-percent limited partner, and 
20 the name of that was Sure-Tech, LLC, I believe. 
21 I Q. Did you prepare the Sure-Tech documents? 
22 I A. No. I was not counsel for Sure-Tech. I acted as 
2 3 counsel for EMLP Projects and Ecology Management. 
2 4 Q. Did you request from Mr. Schultz copies of the 
2 5 documents forming Sure-Tech? 
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1 A. Yes, I did. 
2 Q* Did you receive them? 
3 A. I believe so, yes. 
4 1 Q. Did you receive an operating agreement? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Did you ever review an operating agreement for that 
7 limited partnership? 
8 1 A. No. I don't Know if there ever was one. 
9 Q. Did you specifically ask for one? 
10 A. I asked if they had one, yes. 
11 Q. Whom did you ask? 
12 A. I believe I asked Mr. Schultz or Mr. Evans. 
13 Q. Are you saying that you don't recall, but probably 
14 one of them? 
15 A. Yes. We had wanted to get what documentation we 
16 could for the file about the limited partners, and I was told 
17 on more than one occasion that the internal agreements among 
18 the Sure-Tech people were not yet finalized, and so that they 
19 could not give me definite numbers yet. In particular, I 
2 0 recall Mr. Schultz and Mr. Evans being concerned about what 
21 percentage of Sure-Tech they should give to Mr. Evans, and that 
22 was still in a state of flux. 
23 In fact, I believe in March or April of '93, I went 
24 out to the offices off EML Projects to meet with Mr. Evans and 
25 with Mr. Schultz about that specific matter. As counsel for 
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1 EMLP, I had received a letter from Dean Bradshavs lawyer, 
2 questioning several items about this invention that Steve Evans 
3 had come up with, et cetera, and I went out to meet with Steve. 
4 He was an employee of EML Projects. And Mr. Schultz was there. 
5 He was — had been a lawyer, and had dealt with Mr. Bradshaw, 
6 and at that time they showed me a piece of paper that had 
7 different names broken out, and different amounts, and that 
8 these people were going to be the members of Sure-Tech, and 
9 they were trying to decide how much they needed to give to 
10 Mr. Bradshaw, and would he sue them, and they were concerned 
11 about different tax ramifications. And I don't recall that we 
12 left that meeting with me having received any specific numbers. 
13 But, again, the numbers that I recall looking at, at all times, 
14 showed a combination of the Evanses being a majority interest 
15 holder in Sure-Tech. 
16 Q. Is it your testimony that, notwithstanding what was 
17 going to happen, that you have seen documents that indicate 
18 that it did, in fact, happen? 
19 A. Could you repeat that question, please? 
20 Q. Let me try this more simply, if I can. Is it your 
21 testimony that, notwithstanding what you said today about what 
22 was going to happen as to the ownership of Sure-Tech, that you 
23 have never seen documents indicating that it did, in fact, 
2 4 happen? 
25 I A. I have not seen any documents. 
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MR. GDYON: Thank you. 
MR. DANIELS: Than* you. No more questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, with the conclusion of 
this witness' testimony in the record, are you ready to submit 
and have the Court hear any further argument and make its 
findings and its ruling? 
MR. GUYON: As to the motion for the directed verdict 
sort of thing? 
THE COURT: The Court understands the underlying 
motion is whether or not the settlement agreement entered into 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants is to be approved by 
the Court. 
MR. GUYON: I have no objection to ruling on that 
particular motion. There is, however, one letter which the 
Court has responded — has indicated a desire to look at. It 
will take me a half hour to get that letter. 
THE COURT: Which letter is that? 
MR. GUYON: This is the letter rejecting or 
terminating the initial offer. 
THE COURT: The Court has not expressed any interest 
in the letter. The Court simply asked where it was. 
MR. GUYON: I figured out where it is. I aa going to 
need some time to get it. As to what's before the Court, I 
have no objection. I would submit that. Then we will proceed 
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with our response, in the event of an adverse ruling. 
THE COURT: So that the record is clear, the Court is 
prepared to hear any further argument and make its findings and 
ruling on the question of whether or not the order of dismissal 
should be signed, and the settlement agreement entered into 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants should be upheld by 
the Court. 
MR. GDYON: Your Honor, I am not prepared to do that. 
I have two witnesses that I would like to call before we do 
that, and one item of evidence, the letter, that has been 
referred to, in the movant's part of the case. It will take me 
approximately one half hour to obtain that letter. 
THE COURT: Well, it is up to counsel. If you want 
to extend that courtesy to counsel for Mr. Schultz, you are 
invited to do so. The Court assumed that all those documents 
would be presented this morning, if they were to be considered 
by the Court and argued by counsel. And the Court is ready to 
proceed on the status of the record now. It is your choice. 
It makes no difference to the Court. 
MR. DANIELS: We are ready to proceed. We don't — 
we want to get this thing done, and Mr. Evans has a plane at 
noon. I guess if the letter is here by the time when you are 
still considering it, I have no objection to it. 
THE COURT: I am ready to complete the hearing now. 
We set it for an hour this morning on the question of whether 
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1 or not the settlement agreement should be upheld by the Court, 
2 and whether or not the order of dismissal should be signed by 
3 the Court. The Court understood that was the narrow focus of 
4 this morning's hearing. Correct me if I am wrong. 
5 MR. DANIELS: That's my understanding, too. 
6 MR. NEBEKER: That's my understanding, your Honor, 
7 and the defendants are hopeful that the extensive negotiations 
8 and stipulation of dismissal will be upheld, and will do 
9 everything in order to further that aim. 
10 THE COURT: I am ready to proceed, then. If there is 
11 any further testimony now, the Court will permit counsel to 
12 present it. If there are any further arguments, the Court will 
13 hear from counsel in that regard. But the Court understood 
14 that that was the width and depth of today's hearing, and is 
15 prepared to confine today's hearing to that narrow question. 
16 Anything further from counsel for the plaintiffs, 
17 whoever they may be, or counsel from the other side, whoever 
18 they may be, on the question that has been presented to the 
19 Court this morning? 
2 0 MR. DANIELS: I have some very brief argument, if I 
21 may• 
2 2 THE COURT: Counsel, anything further by way of 
2 3 evidence? 
2 4 MR. GUYON: Yes, your Honor, I have testimony of two 
25 witnesses. I would like to recall Mr. Schultz to discuss the 
51 
organization and the on-going operations and meetings of 
Sure-Tech, and then his secretary as to the mailing of the 
letter, the preparation and the mailing of that letter. 
THE COURT: Do you have a mailing certificate? 
MR. GDYON: The letter, your Honor, rejecting or 
demonstrating the withdrawal of the offer was simply a letter, 
saying we withdraw. It was prepared by one of Mr. Schultz' 
staff, and she is present in the courtroom. I see that, your 
Honor, in the eyes of the Court, as a critical issue, and that 
I think when there is an offer made and an offer withdrawn, 
even though, as the Court has indicated, the best evidence is 
of that letter, I did not in my preparation, which has been 
fairly short for this hearing, recognize the significance of 
that issue. It is my understanding the record, or that the 
letter exists, that Mr. Schultz dictated to have it prepared, 
that his secretary prepared it, and, in fact, had it sent, and 
they are ready to testify. 
That's the best evidence, your Honor, that I can 
provide. Under the rules of procedure, if that, in fact, 
occurred, and that can be demonstrated by unrebutted testimony, 
there is a presumption in the law that the letter was, in fact, 
received. That is sufficient, your Honor, as I understand it, 
to maXe that point. And that's the evidence that I would do. 
It may well be that counsel might have some comments regarding 
that. 
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1 THE COURT: If you would like, the Court will permit 
2 you to proffer that evidence. Frankly, the Court is inclined 
3 to follow what has historically been adopted as the best 
4 evidence rule, and that is the document or the writing itself. 
5 And absent that, the Court is inclined to give little weight to 
6 anything else. But if you would like to augment the record by 
7 way of proffer or by calling the witnesses, you are welcome to 
8 do so. 
9 MR. GUYON: I can do that. Both of them are present 
10 in the courtroom. I could probably do it more quickly by 
11 proffer. 
12 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
13 MR. GUYON: If Mr. Schultz were called as a witness 
14 here at this point, he would testify that there were a number 
15 of annual meetings, and would present documents for the first 
16 annual meeting of Sure-Tech, a limited liability company, which 
17 occurred January 26, 1994. Present were Robert Pett and 
18 Charles Schultz. The only members — 
19 THE COURT: Why don't you go from November of 1994, 
2 0 which is the critical dates involving today's hearing, and then 
21 proceed from that date forward, to May 30, 1995. 
22 I MR. GUYON: The documents that I have, your Honor, 
2 3 are November 24, 199 3, which is a copy of the — 
24 THE COURT: Go to 1994. 
2 5 MR. GUYON: I am sorry. 
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1 THE COURT: Anything you would like to present or 
2 proffer from November of 1994 to May 30 of 1995 would be 
3 critical, in the Court's opinion. 
4 MR. GUYON: Here is the April 27, 1995 report, which 
5 was filed with the Department of Corporations, indicating the 
6 managers of Sure-Tech, Ltd., to be Robert J. Pett and Charles 
7 Schultz, the members to be Robert Pett and Charles Schultz. 
8 THE COURT: Who prepared that document? 
9 MR. GUYON: That is prepared and I believe signed by 
10 Charles Schultz. 
11 THE COURT: Was that signed by any other owner or 
12 manager of Sure-Tech? 
13 I MR. GUYON: No, your Honor, it is not. 
14 There is a document entitled "Amendments,91 which I 
15 believe was filed on the 10th day of April, 1995, which is the 
16 purported articles of amendment, which are signed as dated, 
17 April 30, I believe, 1995, and are signed by Lionel Koon, Fred 
18 Evans and Steve Evans, including a statement that they are 
19 authorized as members to sign that. 
2 0 THE COURT: What does that document purport to do? 
21 MR. GUYON: Purports to amend the articles of 
22 organization. 
23 THE COURT: Does that include or exclude Mr. Schultz 
2 4 from the business? 
2 5 MR. GUYON: Article 4 is amended to substitute Steve 
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1 Evans as registered agent. Article 5 is amended to substitute 
2 I believe it is his home address, 1902 Mary Dott Way, Salt Lake 
3 City, and to appoint as managers of Sure-Tech Lionel Koon and 
4 Fred B. Evans. 
5 THE COURT: The Court has that document. 
6 MR. GUYON: There is another document here entitled 
7 the second annual meeting of Sure-Tech, Ltd. It is dated 
8 February 19, 1995. Present at that meeting were Robert Pett 
9 and Charles Schultz, identifying themselves as the only members 
10 of the LLC. This document is signed by Robert J. Pett and 
11 Charles A. Schultz. I believe, your Honor, those are the only 
12 documents. 
13 We vould like to offer or at least have the Court 
14 take judicial notice of other documents that relate to the 
15 filings in there as part of the record. I don't think they 
16 relate, given the Court's ruling here. 
17 Lisa Spivey is Mr. Schultz' secretary. She is 
IS present in the courtroom. If she were called to testify, the 
19 proffer that I vould make on her behalf is that she assisted in 
2 0 the preparation of the letter, vithdraving the offer that ve 
21 have discussed, that vas made in November, and that she 
22 personally inserted it in the U. S. mails. 
2 3 THE COURT: All right. Anything further? 
2 4 MR. GOYON: The only thing is, for purposes of the 
25 record, hov to provide that these documents become part of it. 
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1 THE COURT: The Court will give you the leeway, 
2 either now or at the conclusion of the hearing, to have them 
3 marked as the defendant's next in order, and, absent some 
4 objection, they will be received into the record. 
5 MR. DANIELS: Your Honor, as to the testimony, as 
6 proffered, of Lisa Spivey, we object to that on the basis of 
7 Utah Rules of Evidence No. 1004, commonly referred to as the 
8 original writing rule, or best evidence rule, and also move the 
9 Court for its order excluding from evidence and striking from 
10 evidence any reference to that letter, based on the same rule. 
11 THE COURT: The objection is sustained, and the 
12 motion to strike is granted. That's been the Court's position 
13 from the outset of the hearing. 
14 All right, anything further? Does anyone want to 
15 argue any further or make any other presentation by way of 
16 exhibit, by way of testimony, or by way of proffer, before the 
17 Court rules? 
18 MR. GUYON: I would like to call and place on the 
19 stand Mr. Charles Schultz. 
2 0 THE COURT: For what purpose? 
21 MR. GUYON: Mr. Schultz has some additional testimony 
22 that he feels is critical to the nature of the hearing, as it 
23 relates to the position of nonmembers of this organization 
2 4 presuming to step in and take over its operation, in violation 
25 of the statutory provisions that control that activity. 
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THE COURT: You may. 
CHARLES A. SCHULTZ, 
called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GUYON: 
Q. Mr. Schultz, you have been sworn. You are still 
under oath. Mr. Schultz, quickly as possible, could you 
explain to the Court the circumstances under which this 
corporation was organized, its compliance with the provisions 
of the applicable code, and circumstances that led to your — 
just a background update into your letter of November of 1994. 
A. Sure-Tech, LLC, was formed, as it says in the 
documents, for the purpose of investing in various companies 
and projects and holding ownership interest in it. Sure-Tech 
was formed by Robert Pett and me. Robert Pett and I at all 
times have been the only members and only managers of Sure-
Tech. Mr. Evans, his parents, Mr. Koon, no one else was ever a 
member. They were never intended to be a member, for the very 
reasons that Mr. Evans alluded to in his testimony. They both 
had tax problems and both had tax liabilities. 
It is true they were to receive a portion of the 
profits of EML, if they ever made any profits, and that was 
distributed through Sure-Tech, but that was a separate 
agreement. They were never intended to be managers, never 
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1 intended to be members, because, if they were, the IRS could 
2 then seize their interest in Sure-Tech. For that very reason, 
3 they were never made members. If EML had ever made any profit, 
4 and it had been distributed through Sure-Tech, it would have 
5 been distributed along the lines that I testified to at my 
6 deposition in the other case, but that did not mean they were 
7 ever intended to be members. 
8 They would have received some sort of consulting 
9 agreement and have been paid that way. It was purposely and 
10 specifically set up so that they would not be members. The 
11 only members would be Mr. Fett and me. That was the way it was 
12 from day one. That's what the organizational agreement 
13 provided for. It specifically states in there that the only 
14 members would be Mr. Pett and me. The initial meeting, minutes 
15 of the meeting, specified that. Only Bob Pett and I were 
16 there. We have those here as records, the originals plus 
17 copies. 
18 The annual report, the first annual report, filed 
19 with the Department of Corporations, shows that the only 
2 0 members were Mr. Pett and me. The second — the first annual 
21 meeting of Sure-Tech records specified Mr. Pett and me. That 
22 was the way it was intended. Second annual meeting, Mr. Pett 
2 3 and me. The second filing with the Department of Corporations 
2 4 shows that only Mr. Pett and me were members. The only 
25 articles are clear. Mr. Evans and his family were never 
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members, never intended to be members, and for that very 
reason. 
The letter of November 17 was sent prior to the 
hearing in this court on the motion to disqualify, and prior to 
a number of other things taking place. As I testified earlier, 
when I terminated my business relationship with Mr. Evans and 
Mr. Koon, I did not want to have anything further to do with 
them. I sent Mr. Evans' letter, specifically saying that we 
would convey Sure-Tech to him and his family, because there was 
a side agreement with EML that said that if EML goes out of 
business, is dissolved, that SO percent of the patent rights 
would come to Sure-Tech. 
Neither Mr. Pett nor I claim any interest in those 
patent rights, and it was our intention Steve would always get 
those. If they came to Sure-Tech, we would convey those to 
Steve. We thought this would be the best way to facilitate 
this. But when Mr. Evans failed to appear for the hearing, 
failed to do other things that were required, it cost us to 
incur more time, litigation expense, more liability, we then 
withdrew that offer. We sent that off approximately ten days 
to two weeks after this. In fact, I think it was the day of 
the hearing, disqualification hearing, or the day after. 
MR. DANIELS: I would ask that be stricken on the 
basis of Rule 1004. 
THE COURT: Overruled. The Court will give Counsel 
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an opportunity to connect it. 
A. I can have that document here, i sent my nephew to 
pick it up. I can have it here probably in 20 minutes. That 
was the document that was prepared and sent. Miss Spivey can 
also testify. She corrected it and mailed it. There is no 
doubt it was sent. This acceptance offer was received some 
time after. 
I also testified in my previous deposition, I was 
asked by Mr. Pishburn about this same document, I testified 
then it had been rejected, and Mr. Evans accepted it only after 
the rejection was sent. 
Mr. Evans never was a member of Sura-Tech. Fred 
Evans was never a member of Sure-Tech. Bea Evans was never a 
member of Sure-Tech. They were never intended to be. There 
are no documents that indicate that they are members, ever were 
intended to be members, and never had any interest. 
Also, with respect to this alleged meeting that they 
had, I never received any notice of that meeting. Mr. Pett 
never received any notice of that meeting. As members, they 
could not have a meeting with respect to Sure-Tech, because 
they weren't members, never were members. 
MR. GUYON: I think he has explained it, your Honor, 
the best way possible. 
THE COURT: Any questions? 
* * * 
60 
1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. DANIELS: 
3 Q. Let me see if I have your testimony straight. As I 
4 understand it, you set this up, Sure-Tech, and profits were to 
5 be distributed according to the documents that we have had, 
6 that you were going to get about 15 percent, and, essentially, 
7 the Evanses were going to get the rest? 
8 A. Initially, it was set up Dean Bradshaw was going to 
9 receive a portion. That never got resolved. But, basically, 
10 profits were going to be distributed, yes. 
11 Q. The amounts changed? Originally, Bradshaw was 
12 supposed to get some, and later that changed? 
13 A. Yes. It later changed, and Dean was not supposed to 
14 get any, I guess. But what the percentage was, it was never — 
15 Q. I guess it didn't matter all that much, since no 
16 profits were ever needed to be distributed? 
17 A. Correct. 
18 I Q. Your business relationship with Mr. Evans broke down 
19 in November of 1994? 
2 0 A. Correct. 
21 Q. You wrote him that letter that has been marked and 
22 received in evidence, saying, essentially, I don't want any 
23 more to do with this? 
2 4 A. Exactly. The reason I wrote that letter is we owned 
25 Sure-Tech, and we were offering to convey it to him. 
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1 Q* You sent him that letter, and you say you changed 
2 your mind shortly thereafter? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. When he sent you the letter in January, accepting 
5 that, you feel that's not timely? 
6 A. The offer had already been terminated by the prior 
7 letter. 
8 Q. So you still considered yourself a manager, really 
9 the main manager of Sure-Tech, after that time? 
10 I A. I am the manager of Sure-Tech, and I am a 99-percent 
11 owner of Sure-Tech. Bob is a 1-percent owner of Sure-Tech. 
12 That's the way it is. That's the way it has always been. 
13 Q. Let me refer you to Exhibit 2. That's the record 
14 from the State Department of Corporations, Department of 
15 Commerce, keeps track of this. Down there on the bottom of the 
16 first page, under "Remarks," it indicates that on February 1, 
17 1995, the LLC was declared delinquent for failure to file an 
18 annual report; is that right? 
19 A. That's what it says. 
2 0 Q. In fact, you didn't file an annual report this year? 
21 A. We did file one, yes. 
2 2 Q. Why did they declare you delinquent? 
23 A. Apparently, they hadn't received it. 
2 4 Q. Oh. And that was mailed to you on February 1. Did 
2 5 you get a copy of that delinquency notice? 
62 
1 A. I honestly don't remember. 
2 Q. Well, on February ~ excuse me — on March 1 the LLC 
3 was suspended, because of no annual report, wasn't it? 
4 A. That's what the record says, yes. 
5 Q. That was mailed to Charles A. Schultz, wasn't it? 
6 A. Correct. 
7 Q. Did you receive a copy of that? 
8 A, I don't remember if I did, or not. 
9 Q. So you were manager of it, and you were running it, 
10 and you had an interest in it, but you don't even remember 
11 whether you got these documents, and you don't remember whether 
12 you filed an annual report? 
13 I A. I know we filed an annual report. We have a copy of 
14 it here. 
15 I Q. It is the State's fault they made this mistake and 
16 suspended you? 
17 A. Whether we were suspended, or not, we filed an annual 
18 report, and we have been reinstated, and the report is here. 
19 Mr. Guyon will show you that, if you like. 
20 I Q. Let me show you what has been marked Exhibit 11. Is 
21 that a letter that you sent to Mr. Evans recently? 
22 A. Yes. I sent it to him on April 21. Excuse me, 
2 3 that's not correct. It was hand delivered to him on April 21. 
2 4 Q. That followed a conversation that you and he had? 
2 5 A. Correct. 
63 
1 Q. In that conversation you settled all the matters that 
2 have to do with this, including the other lawsuit and this one 
3 and all of them? 
4 A. No, we did not. We discussed parauaeters surrounding 
5 which we could settle. 
6 Q. And this document embodies that? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 MR. DANIELS: I would offer this, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Any objection? 
10 MR. DANIELS: It is Exhibit 11. 
11 THE COURT: Absent any objection, it is received. 
12 MR. GUYON: No objections, your Honor. 
13 Q. Do you still want to settle the case on this basis? 
14 A. No. 
15 I Q. You changed your mind on that, too? 
16 A. Correct. 
17 MR. DANIELS: No more questions, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Anything from either counsel? 
19 I MR. GUYON: No questions, your Honor. 
2 0 THE COURT: You may step down. 
21 Anything further? 
2 2 MR. DANIELS: I have brief argument to present, if I 
2 3 may• 
2 4 THE COURT: Let's see if Counsel has any further 
25 evidence that he wants to present. If not, we will hear 
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1 argument. 
2 MR. GUYON: Your Honor, the only thing ve have is 
3 that specific letter that ve have requested, and I think ve can 
4 go on with all the proceedings, absent that, and he is either 
5 going to be here, or not. 
6 THE COURT: We vill proceed vith argument. If the 
7 letter arrives before you are through, assuming there isn't 
8 some type of filibuster in the argument, ve vill consider it. 
9 Otherwise, the Court is ready to hear argument, and proceed. 
10 MR. DANIELS: I vant to be very brief, your Honor. 
11 But the evidence shovs that from the very beginning the Evanses 
12 vere the majority shareholder in this. The document shovs they 
13 vere to receive the majority of the profits. When they talked 
14 to the attorney for the limited partnership, they told her that 
15 they vere going to be members, and have the majority of it. So 
16 vhether he in November decided to vithdrav and give his 
17 interest back, or vhether he didn't, it doesn't really matter, 
18 because the Evanses alvays had the right to call a meeting and 
19 elect new directors. They alvays held the majority. 
20 I I vant to point to the Court I think Mr. Guyon 
21 misperceives, at least as I understand it, hov an LLC vorks. I 
22 vant to drav you to 48-2b-125, which is management of an LLC. 
2 3 And this is what it reads. ,vThe management of the limited 
2 4 liability company, unless otherwise provided in the articles of 
2 5 organization, shall be vested in its members in proportion to 
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1 their interests in the profits of the limited liability 
2 company," and so on. The thing that was filed with the state, 
3 the articles of incorporation, say these are going to be the 
4 managers and the members, until further meetings of the LLC. 
5 It is like a corporation, in this sense, every time 
6 you add a new member, change percentage, change something, you 
7 don't have to go down and file a document with the State. 
8 That's done internally. It changes from time to time. But the 
9 underlying rule is management shall be vested in the members in 
10 proportion to how the profits are to be distributed. That's 
11 what an LLC is supposed to be, a company set up to distribute 
12 profits. That's what this is. They always had the majority 
13 interest. They always had the right to change the managers, 
14 and that's what they did. Whether he withdrew his interest, or 
15 whether he didn't, I think is kind of a side issue, although I 
16 think it is sufficient, in itself, to grant judgment to us. 
17 Even if he hadn't, they always had the right to do this. 
18 We would submit it on that basis. 
19 MR. GDYOM: I appreciate Counsel's argument and 
20 explanation of the law, and it is correct, as far as it goes. 
21 Says if there are no internal documents, then the law applies. 
22 I In this case, your Honor, there are internal documents. That 
2 3 internal document has been admitted as an exhibit. It is 
2 4 called the operating agreement of Sure-Tech. That operating 
2 5 agreement, Section 8.1, page 6, says, "The business of the LLC 
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shall be under the exclusive management of the managers. The 
members who are not managers shall not participate in the 
management of the business of the LLC,19 
This is the point that Mr. Schultz is trying — has 
been trying to make throughout his presentation, is that from 
the inception of this corporation by himself and Mr. Pett, 
there has never been a time when Mr. Schultz and Mr. Pett have 
not been the managers of this corporation, or of this limited 
corporation. Since they have always been, since there is no 
way that has been demonstrated it can be otherwise, they are 
still and remain in control of that business. It is not and 
does not concern the ownership of the corporation, the right to 
management of the corporation, how the profits are distributed. 
The testimony has been, simply, because of tax 
liability problems on behalf of the Evanses, this corporation 
distributes to them certain percentages of its profits, if they 
accrue. They never did accrue. There have been no profits. 
But that does not give them the right to come in and say, We 
are now the managers. They are not now. They never have been. 
They cannot be, unless and until they comply with the 
requirements of the operating agreement of Sure-Tech. They 
have not done this. Therefore, they are not entitled to enter 
into any agreement on behalf of Sure-Tech. 
MR. NEBEKER: Your Honor, in the event that the Court 
finds that there is not authority for the dismissal, the 
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1 stipulation of dismissal, the defendants would as* that the 
2 plaintiff bear the costs incurred by the defendants, including 
3 all attorney's fees, court costs and expenses, for the labor 
4 that went into the settlement agreement behind the stipulation 
5 of dismissal. Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: Anything further from any counsel? 
7 MR. DANIELS: Only to say that if, somehow, you 
8 determine to grant that motion, and assess attorney's fees, it 
9 shouldn't be against either the Evanses or the limited 
10 liability company, but the person who caused this whole problem 
11 by refusing to enter into the settlement, which is Mr. Schultz. 
12 In brief rebuttal, I wanted to point out this 
13 operating agreement, I wanted to remind the Court there is 
14 substantial disagreement about whether that operating agreement 
15 ever existed at the time. Mr. Evans has never seen it before. 
16 It is only signed by Mr. Schultz. And todays the first time 
17 any of us were ever aware of it, including the attorney for the 
18 other side, the defendant here, who, when they were setting 
19 this up, asked to see the document, and didn't ever believe one 
20 existed. 
21 THE COURT: Any further argument by any counsel? Do 
22 all sides submit? 
23 I MR. NEBEKER: We do, your Honor. 
2 4 MR. GUYON: Yes, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: On the narrow issue before the Court this 
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1 morning, dealing with the authority to enter into the 
2 settlement agreement and the order of dismissal being signed by 
3 the Court, the Court finds and rules as follows: The hearing 
4 was set for 9:00 a.m., May 30, 1995. It is now ten after 
5 eleven. The estimate for the hearing was one hour. The Court 
6 still has not received any letter from the office of 
7 Mr. Schultz, indicating that there was a change in the position 
8 of Mr. Schultz to convey his interest to the Evanses on the 
9 Sure-Tech company. 
10 And the Court finds that the best evidence rule 
11 applies, and, absent any document to the contrary, the Court 
12 does not give any substantial weight to the representations 
13 made that after November 17, 1994, and before January 9 of 
14 1995, or before April 9 of 1995, there was ever any change in 
15 Mr. Schultz' willingness to convey his interest in Sure-Tech. 
16 The Court further finds as follows: The chronology 
17 of events are as follows: November 17, 1994, Mr. Evans is the 
18 recipient of a letter authored by Mr. Schultz, wherein he 
19 states as follows: "It is my intention to convey my interest 
20 in Sure-Tech, and Bob,19 assuming that's Bob Pett, "will also 
21 convey his interest in Sure-Tech to you or to whoever you 
2 2 direct* Advise me to whom you wish it conveyed. I will not 
2 3 dismiss the case against EML so that you or whomever you direct 
2 4 can decide what to do.19 That's precisely what occurred several 
25 months later. "However, I am going to withdraw as counsel for 
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Sure-Tech after the conveyance and after the pending motions 
are decided." 
The next document which the Court finds to be 
significant is the letter of January 9, 1995, the recipient 
being Mr. Charles A. Schultz, the author being Mr. Steve Evans. 
That letter confirms, in substance, their villingness to accept 
a conveyance, by Mr. Schultz and Mr. Pett, the withdrawal of 
any interest they have in 8ure-Tech, and conveying any 
interest, whatever it may be, percentage-wise, of Sure-Tech to 
the Evanses. 
The next document of interest is the April 9, 1995 
meeting of the members of Sure-Tech, LLC, wherein, in reliance 
on the documents of November of 1994 and January of 1995, they 
conducted their business, substituted Mr. Schultz as the 
registered agent, replaced Mr. Schultz and Mr. Pett, pursuant 
to the prior agreement, as managers, and proceeded to designate 
new managers and new registered agents. 
The next document of interest is a letter dated April 
21, 1995, to Mr. Evans, authored by Mr. Schultz, wherein, in 
paragraph 6, Mr. Schultz again reconfirms that he and Mr. Pett 
will convey all interest in Sure-Tech. I mean, the only 
documents in the record before the Court are consistent in that 
regard. 
The Court finds that, based on all of those 
documents, and the conduct of the business owners, that 
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1 Mr. Pett and Mr, Schultz, at least for purposes of today's 
2 hearing, did not have any managerial responsibilities in 
3 Sure-Tech. Thereafter, a settlement agreement was entered into 
4 between the plaintiffs, Sure-Tech, LLC, and the defendants, EML 
5 Projects, et al. 
6 The Court finds that there was both express and 
7 implied authority by the plaintiffs and the defendants to enter 
8 into the settlement agreement. 
9 The Court further finds that the parties relied to 
10 the mutual detriment of each other in negotiating and 
11 finalizing the settlement agreement, and that the settlement 
12 agreement is upheld by this Court. 
13 The Court further finds that the order of dismissal 
14 is appropriate in connection with the settlement agreement, and 
15 it will be signed May 30, 1995. 
16 Undoubtedly, other issues will be presented to the 
17 Court on another day, involving this lawsuit. But regarding 
18 the narrow question before the Court in today's hearing, the 
19 Court has found and ruled as articulated. 
2 0 Counsel for Sure-Tech will prepare very detailed 
21 findings and an order reflecting the ruling of the Court from 
22 the bench. Those documents are to be submitted to opposing 
2 3 counsel for approval as to form. They are to be submitted to 
2 4 this Court for signature on or before June 9, 1995. 
25 (This proceeding was concluded.) 
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